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Available online 21 October 2019With an increasing global population and undeniable climate change, environmental terrorism is causing unprece-
dented levels of human insecurity. The use of resources as weapons of armed conﬂict is particularly effective on vul-
nerable societies, triggering large-chain global migration-related issues. This research advances the understanding of
environmental terrorism, addresses the connections of resources and conﬂict, and the effects of climatic events on
these phenomena. The existing related body of literature was scrutinized and complemented with an in-depth empir-
ical study of 100 asylum seekers from 17 countries hosted in German facilities. The results point to the use of environ-
mental terrorism by governments or opposition groups, or both, in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Interviewees provided
accounts of how perpetrators oppressed and harmed their enemies and civilians by attacking, drastically reducing or
cutting the supply of resources, such as water or electricity, and by contaminating water with disease-causing agents.
This paper elaborates on the conﬂict in Syria by presenting empirical evidence on the climate's contribution to the
armed conﬂict in order to demonstrate that environmental terrorism is particularly effective on populations living
in drought-stressed regions. Considering that 81% of interviewees reported observing water or electricity scarcity –
or both – in their place of origin, this research claims that mounting climate pressure on resources is likely to increase
the use of environmental terrorism, thereby contributing to migration and human insecurity across regions. The pur-
pose of this research is to inform academia and policy makers on the strategic importance of monitoring and
preventing resource related threats and violence.Keywords:
Climatic events
Environmental terrorism
Environmental warfare
Human security
Resource scarcity1. Introduction
While environmental terrorism – the co-optation of resources to serve as
both a target and instrument of armed conﬂict – has long been used as a
form of violence, the magnitude of its effects today is unmatched. With
an increasing global population and undeniable global warming, the de-
struction and control of resources is now capable of causing greater and
longer-lasting human health and economic damage, political chaos and
other adverse effects on human security and international peace than it
would have in previous decades.
To date, the claimmade by Schwartz (1998) holds true that the concept
of “environmental terrorism” remains an ambiguous one among policy
makers and academics across disciplines. According to Gleick (2006), envi-
ronmental terrorism is deﬁned as “the unlawful use of force against envi-
ronmental resources or systems with the intent to harm individuals orunb.br,
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).deprive populations of environmental beneﬁt(s) in the name of a political
or social objective.” The deﬁning difference between environmental terror-
ism and other types of terrorism is the speciﬁc target of the former, which
are the environment and resources (Chalecki, 2001; Schwartz, 1998). The
equivocal debate over environmental terrorism stems from its complex dis-
tinction from environmental warfare, which is the use of war tactics that
may cause collateral environment damage, but environmental resources
are not intentionally being targeted (Chalecki, 2001; Gleick, 2006;
Schwartz, 1998; United Nations, 1976). Differentiating between environ-
mental terrorism and environmental warfare is challenging during armed
conﬂict as unlawful acts against non-combatants are not exclusively carried
out by formally organized groups,1 but also by states (Chalecki, 2001).
Moreover, during armed conﬂicts, collateral environmental damage may
occur and accordingly it is complex to determine whether resources were
targeted or damaged intentionally. To remove any ambiguity, this research1 As of the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program (UCDP), a formally organized group is any non-
governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed
force.
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ful use of the environment and resources as weapons and tools during
armed conﬂict, when the distinction between environmental terrorism
and environmental warfare is uncertain.
Links between resource scarcity and national security are clear and
growing and the threat of resources being targeted is real (Gleick, 2006).
However, existing scientiﬁc literature on environmental terrorism remains
limited and understanding of this phenomenon among academics, policy
makers and the public requires timely analysis (Chalecki, 2001; Gleick,
2006, 1993; Yuzon, 1996). Environmental terrorism is considered more
dangerous than conventional civil terrorism because the physical harm is
not conﬁned to the direct effect of the act of violence, resulting in long-
lasting and widespread consequences for the affected population
(Chalecki, 2001; Schwartz, 1998).
The use of water resources and systems as targets with incidents dates
back to 681 BCE in the Tigris and Euphrates region, however, scientiﬁc lit-
erature and understanding amongwatermanagers and society remains lim-
ited (Gleick, 2014, 2006; Lloyd, 1961). Authors consider the chance that
perpetrators strike at water resource and systems a concrete threat for
human security and scientiﬁc literature on environmental terrorismmainly
focuses on this natural resource as a target (Chalecki, 2001; Gleick, 2014,
2006, 1993; Schwartz, 1998). The literature's emphasis onwater-related vi-
olence may be attributed to the increasing amount of data made available
by the water conﬂict chronology of the Paciﬁc Institute since the 1980s,
as well as the high value of this resource as a target for environmental ter-
rorism. Freshwater and water infrastructure are integral to ecological,
human and economic systems, though unevenly and irregularly distributed
across the globe. And while there exists no substitute for water, any disrup-
tion or control thereof has the potential for causing great physical hardship
and economic damage on the impacted population (Gleick, 1993, 2006).
Recent years havewitnessed a global uptick in incidents of water-related vi-
olence, with 279 events related to water and conﬂict only over the last ten
years (Gleick, 2014; Paciﬁc Institute, 2019). And while they occur in many
forms, research on the linkage between water and security often neglects
the role of water in not only being a trigger for war, but also in its use as
an instrument of armed conﬂict (Gleick, 2006, 2014; Tignino, 2010).
Today, water resources and systems are of increasing strategic rele-
vance, as water scarcity is rising, accelerated by anthropogenic factors,
whereby freshwater-related risks of climate change mount with increasing
greenhouse gas concentration (Gleick, 2006; IPCC, 2014). Transformations
in today's economy, climate and society continuously increase global water
scarcity and estimates highlight that 40%of the world's populationwill live
under water-stressed conditions by the middle of next century (De Amorim
et al., 2018; OECD, 2013). Energy security is also considered vulnerable to
climate change and other global risks. The debate about how climatic
eventsmay affect energy supply is become increasingly tenser, as it strongly
inﬂuences economic development, health and quality of life (De Amorim
et al., 2018; IPCC, 2014).
Research on climatic events and their consequences on human security
recently regained momentum, building on earlier research on resource
scarcity, an important mediating factor between climate and conﬂict
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Hsiang, Burke, &Miguel,
2013; Scheffran, Brzoska, Link,& Schilling, 2012). Furthermore, the poten-
tial for increased migration is important to discuss in this context. It is
among the most frequently cited link between climatic events and conﬂict,
which is based on the conviction that climatic events can precipitate and
cause resource scarcity, and ultimately may drive migration as well as con-
ﬂict (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Burrows & Kinney, 2016). Overall, human
insecurity almost never has single causes, and conﬂict of any kind is rarely,
if ever, attributed to any one single motive (Gleick, 2014; IPCC, 2014).
Therefore, climatic events are just one among many important factors con-
tributing to conﬂict, migration and endangering human security (IPCC,
2014). The existing scientiﬁc evidence highlights that the impact of cli-
matic events on societies and human security is shaped by the vulnerability
speciﬁc to each affected entity and whether scarcity or abundance of natu-
ral resources affects the risk of conﬂict or leads to migration, is likely to2depend on intervening factors that make a state more or less vulnerable
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Koubi, Spilker, & Böhmelt, 2014).
The ongoing conﬂict in Syria is a widely discussed example of a conﬂict
with complicated but direct connections to resource scarcity, in particular
water (Gleick, 2014). It is characterized bymultiple mechanisms andmedi-
ating factors that impact the relationship between climatic events and
armed conﬂict. In fact, Ide et al. (2014) claim, that the link between climate
and armed conﬂict may be observed in regions experiencing simulta-
neously a high exposure to climate change, high vulnerability to climatic
events and high risk of armed conﬂict. Between 2006 and 2011, the country
experienced a multiyear period of extreme drought that contributed to agri-
cultural failures, economic dislocations, and population displacement to
urban areas (De Châtel, 2014; Gleick, 2014). Syria's vulnerability during
this period of extreme drought was exacerbated by a combination of an expo-
nentially increasing population growth rate, the government's overambitious
agricultural development projects, andmultiple long-term droughts that kept
the country inmoderate to severe drought from1998 through 2009,with 7 of
11 years recording rainfall levels that fell below the 1901–2008 normal (De
Châtel, 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley, Shahrzad, & Mark, 2015). Overall, the
Syrian conﬂict has many roots beyond its ofﬁcial start in 2011, however,
Gleick (2014) argues that these key environmental factors include both direct
and indirect consequences of water scarcity, the impacts of climatic events
and the use of resources as a weapon or tool during conﬂict.
Various targeted attacks on water systems and power plants by the gov-
ernment and opposition groups were reported by the media, including the
bombing of water resources in 2017 by the Syrian government in Damascus
that cut off access to the water supply for 5.5 million people (Miles, 2017).
Prior to that, anti-Assad rebels took over the Tishrin hydroelectric dam on
the Euphrates River in late 2012 (Mroue, 2012). In 2013, the formally orga-
nized group called the Islamic State (IS) occupied the Tabqa al-Thawrah
dam, which is the largest hydroelectric dam in the country (Saad, 2013).
The IS appropriated dams, canals and reservoirs as weapons in order to
deny water to regions outside of their territories and ﬂooded the route of
approaching enemy armies (Beach, 2015). In the city of Raqqah, the IS
exhausted water reserves and disrupted distribution networks, forcing res-
idents to use untreated water, which led to the spread of waterborne dis-
eases such as Hepatitis A and Typhoid (Ibid.). Moreover, they used their
partial control over the country's energy infrastructure as a bargaining
chip to demand payment for utility services and reportedly collected $20
every two months from business owners in exchange for electricity, water
and security (Beach, 2015; Humud, Pirog, & Rosen, 2015).
This paper seeks to increase the understanding of environmental terror-
ism, in particular the targeting of water and electricity resources. It ad-
dresses the connection between resources and armed conﬂict, the effects
of climatic events on these phenomena, and contributes to the debate on
how the scarcity and changes of the distribution of resources increase the
vulnerability of societies to environmental terrorism and climatic events,
affecting human, national and international security. This research draws
from existing scientiﬁc literature, participant observations and individual
semi-structured interviews capturing the experiences, perceptions and deci-
sions of 100 asylum seekers from 17 countries that were conducted in eight
different migrant housing centers and local networks located across three
German federal states. This paper sought to explore the following main
question, ‘how did asylum seekers perceive resource scarcity in their
place of origin and how is it associated with conﬂict and climatic events?’
and answer the detailed questions of ‘how is water and electricity scarcity
used strategically as weapon and tool?’
2. Theoretical framework
Pressure on resources is expected to increase signiﬁcantly given the grow-
ing global population, which is projected to reach 8.5 billion in 2030 and 9.7
billion by 2050 (United Nations, 2019). In particular, the provision of funda-
mental resources such as water and electricity are under signiﬁcant stress in
the 47 least developed countries, which are among the world's fastest grow-
ing and putting mounting pressure on already strained resources (Ibid).
3 As of the International Energy Agency (2019) ‘energy security’ can be deﬁned as the unin-
terrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.
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though, and while climate change has evident ecological effects, the effects
and dangers of climatic events on societies are less tangible, visible and pre-
dictable (Berlemann & Steinhardt, 2017; Geddes & Scholten, 2016). The
body of literature reveals a general consensus that changing climatewill affect
human security2 across the globe. And while climate is not the only factor
inﬂuencing social and economic outcomes, it is amajor factor that impacts so-
cieties on numerous dimensions and degrees (Carleton&Hsiang, 2016; IPCC,
2014). However, the impact of climatic events on human beings and societies
is shaped by the vulnerability speciﬁc to each affected entity (Brzoska &
Fröhlich, 2015; Scheffran et al., 2012). Across academic disciplines, re-
searchers analyze the extent to which climatic events are responsible for inter-
personal violence, armed conﬂict or non-state conﬂict, terrorism and political
instability (Hsiang et al., 2013). Studies reveal that these phenomena date
back to 10,000 BCE, and the evidence shows that the association of climate
and conﬂict has been observed across all types of conﬂict, human history, re-
gions of the world, income groups and the various duration of climatic events
(Ibid). While overall scientiﬁc research does not conclude on a strong positive
relationship between climatic events and conﬂict (Buhaug et al., 2014;
Theisen&Petter, 2013), theories on the potential of climatic events to increase
conﬂict aremounting and diverse (Brzoska& Fröhlich, 2015; Gleditsch, 2012;
Scheffran et al., 2012). At the same time, the literature underscores the impor-
tant mechanism that conﬂicts increase societies' vulnerability to climatic
events in multiple forms (Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran et al., 2012).
The connection between climatic events and conﬂict is not linear, as
multiple mediating factors are at play (Buhaug et al., 2014; Scheffran
et al., 2012). Since the 1980s, when the links between climate and conﬂict
was a burgeoning area of academic research, resource scarcity has been
considered to be an important link to the relationship. Today, the extent
to which and how the scarcity and changes of distribution of natural re-
sources such as minerals, water, energy, and arable land affect conﬂict is
highly contested (Hsiang et al., 2013; Koubi et al., 2014; Scheffran et al.,
2012). Koubi et al. (2014) highlight that existing scientiﬁc literature pro-
vides signiﬁcant theoretical arguments linking resource scarcity or abun-
dance with conﬂict, however, empirical evidence remains limited,
particularly for the nexus between resource scarcity and conﬂict.
With the level of scarcity and vulnerability of resources becoming more
pronounced, environmental terrorism can now cause farmore deaths, prop-
erty damage, political chaos and other adverse effects compared to previous
decades (Chalecki, 2001). The concept of terrorism has numerous deﬁni-
tions and is highly contested among policy makers and academics, who
are debating whether terrorism exists in isolation from warfare (Chalecki,
2001; Gleick, 2006; Schwartz, 1998). In fact, the difference between envi-
ronmental terrorism andmore conventional environmental warfare reﬂects
the larger dichotomy between terrorism and warfare in general (Chalecki,
2001). Existing scientiﬁc research primarily discusses terrorism based on
the ‘just war theory’ and explains the distinction between warfare and ter-
rorism — based on these criteria that go back to Roman law (Chalecki,
2001; Sussmann, 2013). ‘Just war theory’ seeks to ensure that war is mor-
ally justiﬁable and is divided into two independent sets of rules: the ‘jus
ad bellum’ criterion posits that war must be declared for a good reason
and the ‘right to go to war’ must exist; and the second criterion, ‘jus in
bello,’ is a set of rules that determine the ‘right conduct inwar,’ highlighting
thatwarmust be conducted in a ‘just’ fashion. Chalecki (2001) explains that
the ‘jus ad bellum’ criterion is difﬁcult to apply to terrorism, as a universally
accepted judgement onwhat constitutes rightness does not exist. Moreover,
terrorism clearly violates the second set of rules, since targeting non-
combatants is a central element of its strategy (Chalecki, 2001).
Environmental warfare follows the Environmental Modiﬁcation Con-
vention (ENMOD), formally the ‘convention on the prohibition of military
or any other hostile use of environmental modiﬁcation techniques,’ ap-
proved in 1976, whichwas based on the ‘jus in bello’ criterion, determining2 According to the IPCC (2014) (p.759), human security in the context of climatic events can
be considered, ‘a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and
when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity.’
3that while collateral environment damage may occur, environmental re-
sources are not to be intentionally targeted during war, unless there is a di-
rect military advantage of doing so (United Nations, 1976). Unlike
environmental warfare, the speciﬁc aim of environmental terrorism in-
volves targeting the environment and resources themselves for a political,
social or economic objective (Gleick, 2006). Terrorists targeting resources
do not apply the ‘jus in bello’ criterion on the environment and on humans
as they directly attack human non-combatants and seek to have a psycho-
logical effect on the enemy (Chalecki, 2001; Gleick, 2006). While acts of
terrorism generally have four essential components, namely motivation,
means, target and enemy, the differentiating characteristic of environmen-
tal terrorism lies mainly in the target, which is environmental and not
human. As the distinction between environmental terrorism and environ-
mental warfare is particularly ambiguous for incidents during armed con-
ﬂict, this paper applies the term ‘conﬂict-induced resource scarcity’ to
highlight the unlawful use of the environment and resources themselves
as weapon and tool during armed conﬂict.
While there are several types of environmental terrorism, two broad cat-
egories are highlighted in existing literature (Chalecki, 2001; Gleick, 2006;
Schwartz, 1998). First, the environment or resources can be attacked in
order to create destruction, compromise or control of the target (Chalecki,
2001). For instance, water infrastructure - dams, reservoirs, treatment
plants or pipelines - can be attacked directly, leading to the destruction of
the facility or control over the water or energy supply or both (Gleick,
2006). Secondly, environmental resources such as water, crops, or livestock
can be contaminated through the intentional introduction of poison or
disease-causing agents to harm a human population (Chalecki, 2001). For
example, when water is used as delivery vehicles, poison or disease-
causing agents are used to render water unusable, to destroy puriﬁcation
and herewith disrupt the supply of it (Gleick, 2006).
The attractiveness of resources as a terrorist target depends on their phys-
ical attributes such as scarcity and prestige, the physical location, vulnerabil-
ity to attack and capacity for regeneration (Chalecki, 2001; Gleick, 2006). For
instance, water is a vital resource for human welfare and economic develop-
ment and the scarcity, prestige and vulnerability of water and water systems
are particularly high, thereby increasing the chance that terrorists strike at
this resource (Gleick, 2006, 2014). Energy is a further essential resource to
support humanneeds and economic development and in recent years, the dis-
course over energy security3 has gained prominence as a consequence of ter-
rorist threats (De Amorim et al., 2018). Hydroelectric projects and dams can
be attacked, especially where there exist gross inequities concerning energy
supply (Gleick, 1993). Moreover, energy supply can be disrupted through at-
tacks on oil production, shipping, storage facilities, and routes, which de-
creases oil production and cause price spikes that can seriously harm world
economies and human well-being (Cohen, Kreutzer, Beach, Carafano, &
Ligon, 2011; De Amorim et al., 2018). This research focused on the analysis
of two resources –water and electricity – following along the focus of existing
literature on environmental terrorism. In fact, the interconnections between
water and electricity are numerous as for instance, by attacking a hydroelec-
tric dam, terrorists may obtain control over water and electricity supply. Both
resources are targeted by terrorists across regions and considered important
for the understanding of environmental terrorism.
While resource scarcity is considered an important liaison between cli-
matic events and conﬂict, among the most frequently cited links is the po-
tential for increased migration (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Burrows &
Kinney, 2016). So far, the body of knowledge on the relationship between
these phenomena focuses entirely on a possible security risk that migrants,4
who are motivated by climatic reasons, pose on receiving locations, despiteThis paper follows the United Nations' deﬁnition of ‘international migrant’, which com-
prises ‘any person who changes his or her country of usual residence’ (United Nations 1998)
and the term ‘migrant’ is used broadly including all people who have left their habitual place
of residence, irrespective of legal status, causes for the move, duration of the stay, and nature
of the movement as voluntary or involuntary.
Table 1
Demographic proﬁle of interviewees.
Demographic characteristics
n = 100
(%) Demographic characteristics
n = 100
(%)
Gender Main occupation
Female 36% Housewife 17%
Male 64% Shopkeeper 12%
Student at university 9%
Age of interviewee Student at school 7%
18–28 44% Corporate employee 7%
29–39 30% Unemployed 6%
40–50 22% Construction worker 5%
51–61 4% Mechanic 4%
Teacher 4%
Country of origin (or residency,
if more than 10 years)
Farmer 3%
Syrian Arab Republic 34% Security guard 3%
Iraq 12% Hairdresser 3%
Afghanistan 11% Truck driver 2%
Eritrea 6% Carpenter 2%
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 5% Baker 2%
Somalia 5% Soldier 2%
Kenya 5% Metalworker 2%
Turkey 4% Shepherd 2%
Ethiopia 3% Taxi driver 2%
Cameroon 3% Hotel owner 1%
Pakistan 3% Shoemaker 1%
Egypt 2% Water and soda seller 1%
Yemen 2% Electrician 1%
Chad 1% Doctor of medicine 1%
Sudan 1% Cook 1%
Russian Federation 1%
Jordan 1% Year when interviewee
applied for asylum
Stateless 1% 2017 4%
2016 77%
Marital status 2015 15%
Married 57% 2014 1%
Single 36% 2012 1%
Widowed 4% 2009 1%
Divorced 3% 2003 1%
Religion
Christian 14%
Muslim (Ahmadi, Alawit, Shia, Sunni) 48%
Hindu 1%
No religious or ethnic afﬁliation 1%
Unassigned 36%
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(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015).
3. Methodology
A qualitative phenomenological research approach with individual
semi-structured interviews and participant observation was applied to cap-
ture detailed narratives of the perceptions, lived experiences, decisions, and
behavior of migrants who moved to Germany via irregular means.
3.1. Data collection
Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted in German mi-
grant housings with 105migrants from 17 countries, and with one stateless
person. However, due to a number of challenges, including missing infor-
mation of interviewees, one inexperienced interpreter, and unsigned con-
sent forms, a total of 100 interviews were validated and analyzed. The
data collection process was undertaken between the end of December
2016 and mid-April 2017. Each interview lasted between 30 and 75 min,
and was conducted in the language of the respondent's choice. The inter-
views in Arabic, Kurdish Kurmanji and Sorani, Somali, Persian, Tigrinya,
Dari Persian, Turkish, and Urdu were conducted with the assistance of ex-
perienced interpreters while those in German, English, and French were
conducted directly with the principal researcher. To ensure the safety and
comfort of the interviewees, the interviews were held either in the privacy
of the interviewee's quarters or in an undisturbed location, as agreed upon
by both parties. All interviewees were informed orally and in writing about
the research purpose, specifying the advantages and disadvantages, and
terms of conﬁdentiality of the research project, in addition to the voluntary
nature of their participation. Both the interviewee and interpreter were
asked to sign a consent form prior to starting their interview. The approval
to conduct interviews in the differentmigrant housingswas sought from the
directors of the facilities and, in speciﬁc cases, from the federal
government's regional board.
The individual semi-structured interviews consisted of open-ended
questions that addressed general information about the interviewee's
place of origin and the motivations for leaving it. Moreover, the impact of
possible climatic events on the interviewee's daily lives was questioned,
followed by an inquiry on resource use and alterations. In particular, mi-
grants were interrogated on their perceived alterations of water or electric-
ity supply, or both, in their place of origin. Thosewho did perceive negative
changes were asked to quantify the scarcity in hours of electricity or water
per day. In addition, the perceived tensions or conﬂict and inﬂow or out-
ﬂow of migrants were investigated. The interviews were documented fol-
lowing handwritten protocols, which mainly summarized the responses of
the interviewee, though also included a verbatim protocol of speciﬁc state-
ments. The datawere later transcribed into a digital datasheet and recorded
in the NVivo software. To synthesize the data collected, an explorative the-
matic analysis was conducted. The ﬁeld notes taken from participant obser-
vation and non-verbal communication during the interviews were
triangulated to support the reﬂections and analysis.
3.2. Study participants
To capture a diverse and comprehensive sample of interviewees, the in-
terviews took place in four initial reception facilities and four follow-up ac-
commodations located throughout the federal states of Hesse, Berlin, and
Brandenburg. Purposive sampling was applied to obtain a large and diverse
research sample, for which the criteria were that interviewees be migrants
in Germany who were at least 18 years of age. The popularity of the sports
classes offered by the researcher and the ‘snowball’ method helped to re-
cruit a larger number of migrants who volunteered to participate in the
study and created the opportunity to observe daily interactions. The recruit-
ment of interviewees was stopped once an adequate level of saturation of
information was attained. In fact, the study population resulted in a
highly-cultural heterogeneous group (Table 1).43.3. Methodological considerations and limitations
The recruitment process proved to be a major challenge because many
migrants were reserved or anxious, most likely because they did not want
to relive past trauma. The consent form presented an additional hurdle, as
some migrants were apprehensive about signing it while others were visi-
bly ashamed of being illiterate. Identifying qualiﬁed interpreters was also
demanding, especially because the interviews had to be conducted in
nine languages. The gender and cultural background of the interpreters
put forth an added challenge, as manifested by the reluctance or refusal
of male interviewees to participate with female interpreters.While great ef-
fort was put into ﬁnding qualiﬁed interpreter for each interview, one can-
not conclusively state that all potential misunderstandings and
misinterpretations were avoided. The identity of the interviewer – a
white European woman and outsider of the migrant housing communities
– represented a further limitation, as language, gender, and cultural barriers
were likely to have inﬂuenced the content and amount of data shared. How-
ever, an attempt to balance these limitations was made through careful at-
tention to the interview context and extensive dialogue with the
interviewees. Moreover, in response to the feedback provided by the ﬁrst
round of intervieweeswho explicitly refused to be recorded, a recording de-
vice was not used to document the interviews. All possible efforts were
taken to provide a trustworthy atmosphere to the interviewee, though,
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seekers in a foreign country, one cannot be certain if the interviewees al-
ways reported the truth. This research recognizes its one-sided focus, as it
solely includes migrants that already moved to Germany. Why some
people stay in one placewhereas others choose to leave is a crucial question
to understanding the decision to migrate amid a complex environmental
and social context and should be contemplated in future studies. Moreover,
while this research focused on the analysis of water and electricity as
target for environmental terrorism, it acknowledges that the scrutiny of fur-
ther resources such as food and livelihood should be considered in a follow-
up study.
Given the aforementioned limitations, as well as the relatively small re-
search sample size of 100 interviewees, this research does not claim to be
representative of the overall migrant population in Germany.
4. Results
The ﬁndings of this empirical research describe interviewees reported
resource scarcity, experienced climatic events, human mobility, violence
and conﬂict within different contexts.
4.1. Resource scarcity
Electricity or water scarcity, or both was reported by 81 interviewees
(Fig. 1). Nearly half (45%) of the interviewees experienced resource scar-
city in their place of origin. However, 36% of interviewees from Syria,
Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan reported the beginning or a signiﬁcant in-
crease of electricity or water scarcity, or both, after violence started in
their place of origin (Fig. 1).
Syrian interviewees who worked in the agriculture sector reported ob-
serving increasing water scarcity and continuous reduction in groundwater
since 1997. However, the majority of the group of Syrian interviewees re-
ported electricity or water scarcity or both, speciﬁcally after violence
erupted in their place of origin. One of them recounted that “before the
war, water scarcity was only a problem for farmers as we had two wells
in our village. After the war started, there was no water and electricity for
anyone.” Five Syrian interviewees did not single out resource scarcity, pos-
sibly because they generally resided in major cities like Damascus and
Homs. One interviewee from a village explained that there was no water
scarcity because two rivers ran through his city.
Five Syrian interviewees who lived under the rule of the IS or Free
Syrian Army (FSA) reported that the formally organized groups took con-
trol over water and electricity supply in their city and cut or reduced it to
control and punish the society. Interviewees from Aleppo reported that
the IS cut telephone lines in their city. An interviewee from the YarmoukFig. 1. 81% of interviewees reported reso
5camp, a district of Damascus, who lived under the ruling of the FSA, ex-
plained that their access to electricity was restricted to 2 h or less per day
and they had little water. Other Syrian interviewees explained that after
the war started or after their cities or neighboring cities were invaded by
formally organized groups, the government completely cut or heavily re-
duced the electricity andwater supply. An interviewee fromAl-Hasakah re-
ported that “before the war, there were no problems, but after the war
started, there was suddenly no water and we only had 1 h of electricity
per day. The government claimed that the resource scarcity was due to
the bombing of factories.”
Six Iraqi interviewees reported resource cuts or shortages due to the
ruling of the IS and the Kurdish government. Iraqi interviewees explained
that once the IS had entered their cities, the water supply was extremely re-
duced, and electricity supply was reduced to 1 h per day, or to no electricity
at all. Furthermore, an interviewee from Sulaymaniyah explained that since
the Kurds started governing the region in 1991, electricity was reduced to
3 h per day and the water supply was strongly reduced. He explained that
“to not provide water and electricity is all politics because the government
wants that the people are occupied and do not think about politics.”
An interviewee from Kunduz, Afghanistan recalled that the formally or-
ganized group Taliban cut electricity lines and pressured telecommunica-
tion companies to cease services at night in order to control the society.
He also explained that as the Taliban had important supporters, the govern-
ment was not able to act upon these aggressions. Moreover, an Afghan in-
terviewee from Baghlan reported that he survived an attack perpetrated
by Taliban in his university, where they poisoned the drinking water and
consequently 30 people died. A farmer from Herat, Afghanistan explained
that the Taliban were in his city because it was rich and had a river and a
dam; he recalled so-called ‘water wars’ with terrorists from Pakistan
and Iran and the major problems due to badly managed and distributed
water supply.
Many Syrian and Iraqi intervieweeswho reported resource scarcity after
the conﬂict started in their place of origin, reported about adaptive strate-
gies including investing in a generator for electricity, which was also used
to pump up water from the well, buy expensive water in bottles and multi-
ple interviewees described how people handled the scars water supply by
using the water of the river since the resource scarcity and violence started.
More than half (56%) of interviewees reported violence, armed conﬂict
and non-state conﬂict as their mainmotivation to leave their place of origin
(Fig. 2), out of whom 22 left due to violence and persecution by formally
organized groups, 19 ﬂed because of the overall circumstances of armed
conﬂict, and 15 left their country due to the forcedmilitary service. This in-
terview sample of 56 interviewees who left the country due to violence,
armed conﬂict and non-state conﬂict includes 49 interviewees who also re-
ported resource scarcity.urce scarcity in their place of origin.
Fig. 2.Main driver for migration.
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AKenyan interviewee described the society inMandera as “trapped” be-
cause the continuous droughts, heat and water scarcity impoverished the
region signiﬁcantly and only a few rich people had the resources to move
to neighboring villages during the driest months of the year. However, he
explained that moving is dangerous because migrants are chased out by
the receiving communities that are from different ethnicities.
Syrian intervieweesworking in the agricultural business from the north-
eastern Al-Hasakah governorate were severely impacted by the consecutive
droughts that occurred between 1999 until 2000. They explained that dur-
ing this period, those who had the ﬁnancial means moved to Europe or the
United States; those with less ﬁnancial means moved to Syrian urban cen-
ters. While different Syrian interviewees of this study narrated about the
consecutive droughts at the end of the 1990s, they also mentioned a signif-
icant increase in violence in their home regions.
Moreover, interviewees from different regions in Syria reported about
the dire straits during the droughts that started in 2006 and remembered
family members, friends and acquaintances who moved to urban areas to
ﬁnd a job. A farmer's wife from Al-Malikiyah reported that her family suf-
fered the most in the three years of consecutive droughts that lasted be-
tween 2006 and 2008. During this period, their livestock died, they lost
their entire crops, and consequentially were forced to sell their property
and move to Damascus.
An interviewee from the surroundings of Aleppo explained that her fam-
ily only survived the multiple droughts over the last several years because
they had groundwater and a river that ran through their property, which
had barely enough to feed their cattle. Moreover, since February 2016,
her village was occupied by the IS and therefore the government had re-
duced the resource supply to a minimum and heavily bombed her village.
As she explained, the existence of the river made her entire village less vul-
nerable to the reduction of water supply during the conﬂict and to climatic
events, compared to a nearby village that was heavily affected by droughts.
The severe droughts between 2015 and 2016 strongly affected, among
others, the family of an interviewee from the north of Syria. She explained
that the drought intensiﬁed existing difﬁculties they were facing since
armed conﬂict started, which includedwater and electricity scarcity and ex-
orbitant fuel prices that impeded them to use their well. These challenges,
in addition to the drought forced the interviewee's father to give up his ag-
ricultural business. However, unlike his daughter and the majority of his
relatives, he did not migrate. The interviewee ﬁrmly explained that “de-
spite these problems my father did not leave his home, because no one
leaves his country because of lost crops or a drought, however because of
war.” While interviewees from Somalia, Iraq and Syria reported immigra-
tion to urban areas, they did not recall farmers, resource scarcity and con-
ﬂict or both among migrant communities in urban cities.5. Discussion
The results of this research show that 45 interviewees plainly reported
resource scarcity in their place of origin and additionally 36 interviewees,
the majority of Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis and Afghans, reported that water6and energy scarcity only began after armed conﬂict started and when for-
mally organized groups or the local government took control over the sup-
ply of resources. Interviewee's perceived resource scarcity and narratives
highlight the use of environmental terrorism, in particular water and en-
ergy resources used as weapon and tool in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Re-
sults conﬁrm the claim of Gleick (2006), that environmental terrorism is a
real threat to human security across regions.
Impacts on water distribution systems and intentional attacks on water
systems and power plants, perpetrated by both the government and for-
mally organized groups such as the IS, FSA and Taliban were reported by
interviewees. Syrian and Iraqi interviewees speciﬁcally explained how the
IS used their control over water, water systems and electricity plants as a
strategic weapon to oppress enemies and civilians. Interviewees from
Syria conﬁrm that the Syrian government, the IS and FSA attacked or dras-
tically reduced or cut the supply of water and electricity and how this im-
pacted their daily lives, signiﬁcantly increased insecurity and forced them
to adapt to the circumstances. For instance, narratives of interviewees
from Aleppo and surrounding villages, reporting the attack and control of
water systems and electricity plants by formally organized groups and the
government, coincidewithmedia reports tracked in thewater conﬂict chro-
nology of the Paciﬁc Institute. In 2012, media reports highlight, that a
major pipeline delivering water to the city of Aleppo was badly damaged
during conﬂict and other reports describe how rebels overrun government
forces and capture the Tishrin hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River in
the Aleppo governorate (BBC, 2012; Mroue, 2012; Paciﬁc Institute, 2019).
Moreover, Afghan interviewees reported how the Taliban demonstrated
their clout by disrupting the energy supply and using water as delivery ve-
hicle to poison its enemy. Although the reported incidents of Afghan inter-
viewees do not coincide with recorded attacks in recent years, they
highlight that Taliban uses environmental terrorism to harm individuals
or deprive populations of water and electricity in the name of their political
or social objectives.
Resource scarcity was not speciﬁcally mentioned as a driver for migra-
tion, however interviewees from multiple backgrounds explain that the
scarcity of water and electricity signiﬁcantly increased their vulnerability,
as it deteriorated their living conditions and formany, resource scarcity sig-
niﬁcantly aggravated circumstances of conﬂict. Therefore, this research as-
sumes that among the 49 interviewees who ﬂed their country due to
conﬂict, armed conﬂict, non-state conﬂict, and also reported resource scar-
city, the challenges faced due to resource scarcity may have inﬂuenced
their decision to migrate.
The results of this research show that resource scarcity is an obviously
perceived challenge across regions, as 81% of interviewees reported
water or electricity scarcity, or both in their place of origin. Now,mounting
global population and climatic pressure on resources is likely to increase
scarcity of resources, value and attractiveness for environmental terrorism.
Syrian interviewees conﬁrm the multiyear period of extreme drought,
which contributed to agricultural failures, economic dislocation, and mi-
gration between the years 2006 and 2011 (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al.,
2015). This long-term drought, which authors coined as the most severe
drought in history of the fertile crescent region, signiﬁcantly impacted in-
terviewees from the north-east of Syria, however, was also perceived by
Syrians from different regions of the country (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al.,
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also due to climatic events, and conﬁrmed multiple factors which intensi-
ﬁed the effects of the long-term drought. Firstly, it was intensiﬁed by an in-
creased demand for resources in Syria, as the country's population grew
from four million in the 1950s to 21 million in 2010 (Kelley et al., 2015;
Worldometers, 2019). Moreover, despite the growing water scarcity and
frequent droughts, the government of President Hafez al-Assad (1971–
2000) initiated unsustainable water and agricultural policies, which
overstretched both land and water resources (De Châtel, 2014; Kelley
et al., 2015). As different interviewees conﬁrm, this factor contributed to
signiﬁcantly deplete the groundwater levels and shaped Syria's vulnerabil-
ity to droughts. Lastly, the late 1990s droughts strongly impacted the pop-
ulation, in particular farmers and pastoralists in the north and northeast of
Syria, as various interviewees afﬁrmed. Kelley et al. (2015) claim, that Syria
never fully recovered from these severe droughts, leaving the country par-
ticularly vulnerable to the long-term drought, which hit the country be-
tween 2007 and 2011. Based on the collected evidence, this paper claims
that conﬂict-induced resource scarcity used during the Syrian conﬂict
was particularly effective on the vulnerable Syrian populations in
drought-stressed regions. Therefore, while climate is just one among
many factors, climatic events could be considered a contributor that
spurred the Syrian conﬂict.
Based on narratives highlighting mounting climate pressure on re-
sources, this research claims, that climatic events may affect conﬂict, the
decision tomigrate and the use of environmental terrorism can be expected
to increase in particular in drought-stressed regions. However, it is impor-
tant to note, that till date, other societal challenges remain dominant as
main factors, in particular for migration (Fig. 2). Shifts in climate take de-
cades to be clearly understood and assimilated, if at all, and oftentimes per-
ceptions and actions, either positive or negative, only occur when a crisis is
acute (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015).
The ﬁndings conﬁrm the non-linear strong connections between cli-
matic events and conﬂict (Barnett & Adger, 2007), which is ﬁrstly demon-
strated bymultiple existing intervening factors. Secondly, results underline,
that on the one hand, a society effected by climatic events is more vulnera-
ble to environmental terrorism, however, on the other hand, this tactic also
leaves a society more vulnerable to climatic events. Empirical results show
that environmental terrorism carried out by formally organized groups or
governments or both, can signiﬁcantly increase a society's vulnerability,
also to climatic events. Syrian interviewees reported how climatic events,
which hit the country during the conﬂict, exacerbated or contributed to
existing difﬁculties, including resource scarcity, they faced during conﬂict.
This research underscores the importantmechanism outlining that conﬂicts
increase societies' vulnerability to climatic events (Buhaug et al., 2014;
Scheffran et al., 2012) and suggests that climatic eventsmay have impacted
vulnerable societies that were already suffering from conﬂict-induced re-
source scarcity during armed conﬂict. Yet, when climatic events hit already
vulnerable populations, the climate impact will be signiﬁcantly stronger, as
the society's sensitivity and adaptive capacity to climatic events is weak-
ened, effecting individual's livelihoods and health, among many other fac-
tors of human security. This, in turn, may potentially intensify an ongoing
conﬂict or lay the ground for increased sociopolitical instability and cause
migration movements towards more resource-rich regions. This analysis
demonstrates that the consequences of climatic events and conﬂict may
present similar circumstance. Therefore, this research suggests that conﬂict
may cause climatic event-like circumstance, where environmental terror-
ism causes comparable circumstances as climatic events, increasing vulner-
ability of affected entities, aggravating livelihood- and overall human
insecurity.
This research speciﬁcally investigates the widely discussed link in liter-
ature, where climatic events cause rapidmassmigration, leading to conﬂict
in receiving areas. However, the resulting empirical evidence on this link
remains ambiguous and inconsistent, conform to existing theoretical and
empirical evidence (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015). None of the interviewees
engaged in conﬂict over resources in receiving locations or perceived vio-
lence among migrants or with residents in urban centers. While existing7theory should not be discarded, this research supports the widespread skep-
ticism on this link and discords based on the ﬁndings, existing evidence re-
vealing that most migration ﬂows, did not lead to conﬂict (Burrows &
Kinney, 2016), and mainly because this theory generally assumes a
mono-causality in migration decisions, which implies that people migrate
solely due to climatic events, which is rarely the case (Black et al., 2011).
This does not imply that climatic events are irrelevant for future patterns
of migration or migration linked to conﬂict. However, while migration
studies havewitnessed tremendous progress in the understanding of the en-
vironment over the past 20 years (Cattaneo & Peri, 2015; Hunter, Luna, &
Norton, 2015), authors argue that the climate-migration literature has
placed too much emphasis on climate as the driving factor of migration
(Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015).
6. Conclusions
Rising political and scientiﬁc attention on the potential impacts of
global warming on human, national and international security and peace,
and the ambiguity and complexity of environmental terrorism, have in-
spired this paper. To the last point, this research was committed to advance
the understanding of environmental terrorism, the linkages among re-
sources and human security and the impact of climatic events on this rela-
tionship. For this purpose, existing related scientiﬁc literature was
scrutinized and individual experiences and decisions of 100 asylum seekers
from 17 countries hosted in German facilities were explored.
This paper argues that populations affected by climatic events, espe-
cially those living in drought-stressed regions, are particularly vulnerable
to environmental terrorism. The Syrian conﬂict may be rooted in long-
standing political, social and ideological disputes and economic disloca-
tions from both global and regional factors. However, the direct and indi-
rect consequences of water scarcity, including the impacts of climatic
events provided ideal conditions for the use of conﬂict-induced resource
scarcity. Evidence of environmental terrorism in Syrian, Iraq and
Afghanistan underlines that the links between resource scarcity and na-
tional security are clear and growing and the chance that governments or
opposition groups strike at water systems, electricity plants and use re-
sources as target, weapon and tool, is real.
Moreover, results show that society's suffering under environmental ter-
rorism may become more vulnerable to climatic events. Therefore, this
paper suggests that research on the nexus between climatic events and con-
ﬂict, in particular environmental terrorism,may consider a diverse research
approach,where conﬂict causes climatic event-like circumstance. In light of
the prediction that climate change will be an increasingly important driver
of human insecurity in the future, the pace of gathering knowledge on
climate's impact could be accelerated by considering the non-linear rela-
tionship and parallels of risks and consequences of climatic events and con-
ﬂict on human security.
Scientiﬁc research has an important role to ﬁll in reversing the current
neglect of research on the linkages between water and international
peace and security and the relationship between water and conﬂict, foster-
ing analysis on howwater is used as weapon or tool, or both during conﬂict
and not only as factor triggering conﬂict (Gleick, 2006, 2014; Tignino,
2010). In addition, the evidence that perpetrators of environmental terror-
ism are not exclusively formally organized groups, however, include gov-
ernments may foster research and increase monitoring of government's
warfare tactics.
Based on the scientiﬁc evidence that climate change is real and global
population growth projections deﬁnite, it is expected that strain on re-
sources, value, vulnerability and attractiveness as terrorist target increases
continuously. Therefore, environmental terrorism is likely to increase, in
particularly in drought-stressed regions, causing more and longer human
health and economic damage over time, unlessmechanisms for reducing re-
source insecurity can be identiﬁed and implemented.
Since 2010, the United Nations General Assembly recognizes the
human right towater and sanitation and that the denial of water to civilians
constitutes a war crime. Findings of this research on conﬂict-induced
C. Kohler et al. Research in Globalization 1 (2019) 100006resource scarcity in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, should persuade policy
makers to protecting water resources, based on the UN resolution 64/292
and ensure energy security in conﬂict zones and raise global awareness. Ac-
ademia and the international community should monitor resource related
threats and prevent resource-related violence. Moreover, it becomes deci-
sive for human security to improve and implement conﬂict-sensitive miti-
gation and adaptation strategies that contain conﬂict, for instance with
strategies impeding formally organized groups to gain control over water,
water systems and power plants. Precautious actions to reduce the risks of
conﬂict and resource scarcity could be sought through international coop-
eration, effective institutional frameworks, conﬂict management, and gov-
ernance mechanisms to prevent resource-related violence. Moreover,
practitioners and NGOs in conﬂict zones may emphasize the need of re-
source and provide assistance and information especially among popula-
tions at risk.
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